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This  paper  considers  the  various  strategies  rural  households  employ  to  avoid 
consumption shortfalls caused by realizations of adverse income shocks. First, we 
develop  an  ex  post  theoretical  model  within  an  inter-temporal  utility  maximizing 
framework  which  we  use  to  explain  households’  decisions  to  insure  against 
idiosyncratic risk and save to protect against uninsurable spatially covariant risk. In 
the theoretical model we show that the latter can take a variety of different asset forms 
depending on the absolute level of risk aversion of the household and the variability in 
asset returns. Second, using household level panel data from Vietnam  we test the 
extent to which households’ smooth consumption over time and how this depends on 
the presence of insurance and saving instruments. Third, we consider savings and 
liquid  asset  holdings  as  a  form  of  self-insurance  or  precautionary  savings  against 
spatially covariant shocks. Overall, our results suggest that households deplete their 
stock  of  total  liquid  assets  in  the  event  of  exposure  to  both  exogenous  and 
idiosyncratic income shocks. The ability of households to cope is also dependent on 
their receipt of public and private transfers in the event of an exogenous natural shock 
with insurance claims serving to alleviate the depletion of livestock holdings in the 
event  of  insurable  idiosyncratic  income  shocks.  These  results  are  particularly 
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Vulnerability to shocks is a dominant feature of household livelihoods in developing 
economies.  A  fundamental  problem  facing  rural  households  is  how  to  maintain 
satisfactory levels of consumption in the face of adverse income shocks. These shocks 
can  affect  a  household’s  welfare  by  negatively  impacting  on  household  income, 
existing household wealth and the health of household members. This paper considers 
the various strategies rural households employ to avoid consumption shortfalls caused 
by  realizations  of  adverse  income  shocks.  We  categorize  shocks  as  either 
idiosyncratic or spatially covariant (for example, a flood which affects all households 
in a particular location), with the former insurable in formal financial markets, and the 
latter non-insurable, thereby creating a theoretical motive for precautionary saving. 
We  first  develop  an  ex  post  theoretical  model  within  an  inter-temporal  utility 
maximizing  framework  which  we  use  to  explain  households’  decisions  to  insure 
against idiosyncratic risk and save to protect against uninsurable spatially covariant 
risk. In the theoretical model we show that the latter can take a variety of different 
asset forms depending on the absolute level of risk aversion of the household and the 
variability  in  asset  returns.  Second,  using  panel  data  from  rural  households  in 
Vietnam, we test the extent to which households’ smooth consumption over time and 
how this depends on the presence of insurance and savings instruments. Third, we 
consider savings stocks in the form of liquid assets (livestock holdings, grain stores, 
savings and borrowings) as a form of self-insurance or risk-coping strategy against 
spatially  covariant  shocks.  To  our  knowledge  this  is  the  first  empirical  study  to 
incorporate  both  formal  insurance  and  savings  instruments  together  within  a 
development context. 
 
For  many  poor  farmers  in  developing  countries,  risk  remains  a  serious  cause  of 
poverty and ruin (Fafchamps, 2009). The precise nature of the realized risk or shock 
incurred  has  implications  for  a  household’s  ability  to  cope  and  its  consequences 
(Dercon, 2002). The literature typically distinguishes individual (idiosyncratic) shocks 
from common (spatially covariant) shocks whereby the former affect an individual 
household or income earner only (for example, injury, illness, death, divorce, etc.), 
while the latter may have regional or even country-wide effects (for example, natural 
disasters,  price  shocks).  We  explicitly  distinguish  between  the  terms  ‘shocks’  and 
‘risk’  whereby  a  shock  can  be  unanticipated  by  the  recipient  household  and  once 
suffered, the household engages in risk-coping strategies (whether anticipated or not). 
Put differently, this paper examines the consequences of risk on household behaviour 
ex post. The literature has found that spatially covariant shocks, and, in particular, 
weather related events such as rainfall, can negatively impact on human welfare. For 
example, Alderman et al (2006) found that detrimental weather can impact on the 
nutrition and height of children while Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that weather 
related  events  can  affect  school  attendance  and  enrolment.
1 There  is  also  much 
evidence to support the detrimental effect that the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks 
can have on a household with many finding evidence in support of the dominance of 
idiosyncratic shocks (Morduch, 2004; Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1991). Shocks can also 
be categorized by their frequency and the magnitude of their impact. Dercon (2002) 
finds  that  relatively  small  but  frequent  shocks  are  easier  to  deal  with  than  large, 
                                                 
1 In contrast, Deaton (1997) finds that covariant shocks for certain villages explain little of the variation 
in household income within villages in Cote d’Ivoire.  
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infrequent adverse shocks, while Alderman (1998) finds that consumption smoothing 
is more difficult with successive shocks than with single shocks. In addition, some 
shocks may have persistent effects (for example, health problems). 
 
In addition to having an impact on a household’s ability to cope, the nature of the 
shock is also important for understanding the strategies households use to cope with 
its  adverse  consequences.  Idiosyncratic  shocks  can  be  insured  informally  at  a 
community level, or, if available, via formal insurance contracts with a third-party 
insurer. Recent literature suggests that the lack of formal insurance, both in terms of 
market availability and actual take-up, is one of the key drivers of persistent levels of 
poverty  in  developing  countries  (Morduch,  2002).  This  lack  of  formal  insurance 
together with a lack of other formal means to smooth the consumption of low-income 
households  is  a  central  feature  of  livelihoods  in  the  developing  world.  Spatially 
covariant  shocks  are  more  difficult  to  insure  collectively  and  formal  insurance 
contracts  are  extremely  rare  for  reasons  of  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection. 
Consequently, households in risky environments develop sophisticated strategies to 
reduce the impact of shocks (Dercon, 2002). Alderman and Paxson (1994) distinguish 
between risk-management and risk-coping strategies whereby the former attempt to 
affect ex ante how risky the income generating process is (‘income smoothing’) while 
the  latter  deal  with  the  consequences  ex  post  of  income  risk  (‘consumption 
smoothing’).  A  considerable  body  of  literature  on  savings  and  consumption 
smoothing  explores  the  concept  of  precautionary  savings  (Zeldes,  1989;  Kimball, 
1990;  Deaton,  1991,  1992;  Udry,  1994).  The  evidence  suggests  that  in  rural 
populations  where  credit  constraints  are  binding,  inefficient  savings  behaviour  is 
likely to occur.
2 The savings of many poor households appear to be a pre-emptive 
response to income shocks, which would not entail the optimal allocation of risk, 
rather  than  a  long  term  investment  decision.  Despite  the  empirical  challenges  in 
distinguishing  precautionary  motives  from  inter-temporal  or  bequest  motives, 
evidence  supports  significant  inefficient  saving  behaviour  which  violates  the 
permanent-income hypothesis.  
 
In this paper, our primary hypothesis proposes that in the absence of formal insurance 
contracts  for  spatially  covariant  risk  transfer,  a  risk-averse  household  engages  in 
precautionary  savings  strategies  to  buffer  against  forms  of  spatially  covariant  risk 
while  formally  insuring  against  forms  of  idiosyncratic  risk.  We  attempt  to 
theoretically isolate the precautionary savings component of household savings levels. 
In addition to accumulating savings stores for precautionary (and other inter-temporal) 
motives, evidence also suggests that risk-averse households accumulate other forms of 
liquid assets for self-insurance purposes. Under severe credit constraints households 
may  be  forced  to  sell  productive  assets  to  smooth  consumption.  Rosenzweig  and 
Wolpin  (1993)  provide  evidence  that  farmers  sell  bullocks  when  faced  with  an 
unfavourable  crisis  in  Icrisat  villages  in  India.  Fafchamps  et  al  (1998)  find  that 
livestock transactions in the West African semi-arid tropics are responsive to income 
fluctuations while Lim and Townsend (1998) find that the most effective approach to 
risk-coping at the household level is by self-insurance through in-kind saving (for 
example, building up grain reserves and drawing them down as required). In addition 
to forms of household savings  (for  example, formal savings instruments, informal 
                                                 
2 Udry (1994) found evidence of precautionary savings in rural villages of northern Nigeria where he 
showed that these households saved significantly in anticipation of transitory shocks. Deaton (1992) 
found that significant savings were made in anticipation of income shocks in Cote d’Ivoire.  
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savings and ROSCAs), this paper also considers other forms of asset accumulation in 
the  form  of  livestock  holdings  and  crop  stores  as  precautionary  saving  strategies 
against spatially covariant risk, as well as borrowing. 
 
Our application to panel data from Vietnam provides us with a unique opportunity to 
incorporate formal insurance and precautionary savings into the analysis. Our data 
come from the Vietnamese Access to Resources Household Survey for 2006, 2008 
and 2010 and include detailed information on households’ financial resources, access 
to and purchase of formal insurance, and the incidence of idiosyncratic and spatially 
covariant shocks. Given that formal financial markets (including insurance markets) 
are more developed in Vietnam relative to other developing economies, our prior is 
that households successfully insure away risks or accumulate sufficient precautionary 
savings to facilitate consumption smoothing in the face of adverse income shocks. If, 
however, risk-coping mechanisms are insufficient and full recovery from shocks is 
not achieved in spite of rural Vietnam’s relatively well developed financial markets, it 
is doubtful that recovery can be achieved in less endowed regions of the developing 
world. 
 
We first identify which households have not achieved consumption smoothing across 
the timeframe under consideration. We find that ‘consumption smoothing’ is more 
difficult for households suffering income shocks, but this shortfall is reduced with 
crop stores, livestock holdings and income levels. Though subject to selection bias, 
insured households’ record no significant shortfalls in consumption over time while 
uninsured households’ suffer consistent shortfalls. We then estimate a reduced form 
fixed effects model to ascertain if liquid assets are depleted in response to spatially 
covariant shocks providing evidence that they serve precautionary savings purposes. 
The model also considers the role of public and private transfers as well as insurance 
claims in buffering against adverse idiosyncratic and spatially covariant shocks. Our 
results  suggest  that  total  liquid  asset  holdings  are  depleted  in  the  event  of  both 
idiosyncratic  (insurable)  shocks  and  exogenous  spatially  covariant  natural 
(uninsurable)  shocks.  Public  and  private  transfers  together  with  formal  insurance 
claims appear to be emerging as important risk coping mechanisms in the face of 
spatially covariant natural and idiosyncratic shocks respectively. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 details the conceptual 
framework  used  for  the  analysis  while  Section  3  outlines  the  empirical  approach; 
Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section, we develop a simple two-period model incorporating both spatially 
covariant  and  idiosyncratic  risk  that  captures,  in  a  stylized  manner,  the  formal 
insurance and savings (including precautionary savings or self-insurance) decisions 
made by rural Vietnamese households (and elsewhere) in the anticipation of shocks. 
Households can purchase formal insurance and accumulate precautionary savings and 
assets in order to forearm themselves in the face of income and wealth variability. 
Households  will  then  employ  dissaving,  selling  of  real  assets  and  activation  of 
insurance  contracts  as  corresponding  risk-coping  mechanisms  in  response  to 
realizations of spatially covariant and idiosyncratic risk. Formal insurance decisions  
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are modelled separately from savings decisions and it is explicitly assumed that the 
idiosyncratic household risk under consideration is completely transferable while the 
spatially covariant risk is not. The primary goal of this model is to determine the 
optimal risk-management portfolio for the household when liquid assets and savings 
instruments, together with formal insurance instruments, are available. It is assumed 
for  the  purposes  of  this  model  that  credit  constraints  are  not  binding  thereby 
facilitating negative asset values. As already noted by Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984) 
and Gollier (1994), it does not hold that for non actuarial premia, formal insurance is 
always more efficient than asset accumulation/savings and these competing objectives 
are empirically analyzed within the context of a household in a developing economy.  
 
Adapting  a  theoretical  approach  developed  by  Ventura  and  Eisenhauer  (2005)  we 
model  a  representative  household  with  a  wealth  endowment     and  a  thrice 
differentiable state independent utility function  , where  
       0,  
        0 and 
 
         0. To determine in  a stylized way  the  factors affecting the households’ 
optimal level of insurance and saving (including precautionary saving), we consider 
the following two-period model in which future income and wealth is a linear function 
of current wealth but the slope     and intercept     are uncertain. To maximize utility 
from total wealth, the household selects a level of insurance coverage      0,1 , and 
savings  . The household’s expected utility problem is therefore: 
 
         ,  ,                            1    ̃                             (1) 
 
where     is a random variable representing an exogenous spatially covariant wealth 
shock (for example, floods, drought, crop disease) with mean     1 and variance   
2, 
and     represents  an  idiosyncratic  shock  (for  example,  divorce  or  illness/death  of 
household  member),  with  probability  distribution      ,    ,…,      with  each 
     0 for all losses and with           . The spatially covariant multiplicative shock 
    captures the fact that natural shocks (for example, floods, drought etc) together with 
economic  shocks  could  deplete  the  households’  wealth  holdings  over  time.  The 
idiosyncratic shock     attempts to capture in a stylized fashion, the various household 
income shocks during the family life cycle. In this simplified set-up time preferences 
and the risk free interest rate are assumed to cancel each other out so that the inter-
temporal motive for insurance and saving is captured only by the difference between 
current and expected future wealth. We also impose a mean preserving spread as per 
Ventura (2007) to ensure that second period expected future wealth remains constant 
to  eliminate  any  additional  inter-temporal  motive  to  save.  Insurance  against  the 
idiosyncratic shock    , is modelled with reference to Gollier (1994), Briys (1986) and 
Dionne  (2000)  whereby  households  have  the  opportunity  to  purchase  formal 
insurance contracts which consist of a generalized indemnity function   .  such that 
the household receives payment        in the event of a realized idiosyncratic loss    . It 
is assumed that the premium per unit coverage for a given indemnity function   .  
takes  the  form                where     1 is  a  loading  factor.  Letting           
implies  a  premium  rate               .  Note  that      1  represents  full  insurance 
coverage for the idiosyncratic risk while     0 indicates full self-insurance where all 
idiosyncratic and spatially covariant risk is borne in full by the household. It is also 
assumed that insurance premium per unit coverage,              , where     1, is 
actuarially  fairly  priced.  The  First  Order  Conditions  with  respect  to  each  control 




 :                 1    ̃                                            0      (2) 
 :                 1    ̃              1    ̃                              (3) 
 
where  ̃  represents  stochastic  returns  to  savings  which  may  vary  with  spatially 
covariant shocks. Equation (2) states that the expectation of the marginal insurable 
risk variable                 times the marginal utility of wealth is zero at the optimum. 
This reflects the basic insurance analytical result that if a household is risk averse, 
then full insurance will be demanded, thereby transferring all idiosyncratic risk to a 
risk neutral insurer, if (and only if) markets are complete and pricing is actuarially fair. 
In other words     1 if (and only if) the loading factor,     1. Equation (3) reflects 
the theoretical result that assuming the idiosyncratic risk has been insured away in full 
(    1), the precautionary saving component of   is undertaken in response to the 
remaining variance of future wealth   
  given the related assumptions above.
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In  order  to  obtain  an  approximation  for  the  level  of  the  precautionary  savings 
component within   within this stylized model, we Taylor expand marginal utility 
from  equation  (3)  around  wealth     and  solve  for    .  After  some  algebraic 
manipulation and simplification (setting   1    ̃    1 to eliminate impatience as a 
motive for saving, setting     1 for full insurance coverage and     1 for actuarially 
fair pricing), we obtain the following approximation for savings   (see Appendix for 
full details): 
 
   
      
                                             
                     (4) 
 
where   is the coefficient of absolute prudence. The first term on the right hand side 
of equation (4) can be interpreted as the precautionary savings component of   and is 
directly  proportional  to  income  uncertainty  as  represented  by  the  variance  of  the 
spatially covariant risk,   
2. The remaining terms can be thought of as the combined 
effect  of  bequest  and  inter-temporal  motives  (Ventura  and  Eisenhauer,  2005). 
Noteworthy too is that the insurance premium for idiosyncratic risk,  , has a negative 
effect on the overall savings level of the household. 
 
There  is  ample  evidence  that  households  across  the  developing  world  accumulate 
savings and liquid assets as a form of precautionary saving (Fafchamps, 2009; Deaton, 
1992; Deaton, 1991). We follow the theoretical approach taken by Fafchamps et al 
(1998) and Newman et al (2011), only here the analysis focuses in a generalized way 
on the inter-temporal allocation of total savings   between savings stocks (including 
formal and informal savings, gold, ROSCAs), crop stores (for example, rice and other 
crops), livestock holdings and forms of borrowings (including formal and informal 
loans). We impose that savings can occur in a safe form with a positive rate of return 
as per Deaton (1991). By normalizing   to 1, assuming normal asset returns, CARA 
preferences and including a riskless asset with return  0 (for example, return to formal 
                                                 





savings),  a  household  concurrently  solves  the  following  portfolio  mean-variance 
allocation problem (see Connor et al (2010), page 18 for details):
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       1    
  1
   0     
     
1
2   
                 (5) 
 
where    is a vector of portfolio weights,   is the number of portfolio assets,   is a 
vector  of  asset  returns,   is  the  co-efficient  of  absolute  risk  aversion  and   is  the 
assets return variance-covariance matrix. A closed form solution to equation (5) is 
given by: 
 
    
1
  
 1    1
  0                  (6) 
 
where the portfolio weights    do not sum to 1, instead the holding in the riskless 
asset is implied by the unit sum condition. Equation (6) illustrates that at the optimum 
a risk-averse household will apply positive portfolio weighting in direct proportion to 
those assets having higher excess return over the risk-free rate and reduced portfolio 
weighting to those assets with higher variances and co-variances of returns. 
 
3. Empirical Considerations 
 
The theoretical predictions from Section 2 can be summarized in the following way: 
First, equation (2) predicts that the insurance coverage rate is     1 under the standard 
assumptions  of  complete  insurance  markets  and  actuarially  fairly  priced  contracts. 
Here, a risk-averse household will fully insure the idiosyncratic portion of the risk it 
faces. Second, equation (4) predicts that the household precautionary saves to buffer 
against  the  remaining  spatially  covariant  risk  whereby  the  precautionary  savings 
component of total savings   is a direct function of total wealth,  , the variance of 
the spatially covariant risk   
2, and the coefficient of absolute prudence  . 
 
The  first  and  second  theoretical  predictions  can  be  empirically  tested  by  first 
determining  whether  households  manage  to  smooth  consumption  over  time,  in 
particular, in the face of an adverse income shock (both idiosyncratic and spatially 
covariant) and in the presence of savings and formal insurance.
5 Our identification 
strategy is as follows: In the first step we estimate a standard household consumption 
equation for period  1. 
 
         
                             (7) 
 
                                                 
4 In this simplified set-up we implement a myopic investment strategy for the household. Samuelson 
(1969) shows that if an investor has constant relative risk aversion and returns are (i.i.d) through time, 
then dynamic portfolio optimization has a myopic solution. 
5 As  the  dataset  available  represents  a  three  year  panel,  we  are  effectively  capturing  a  short  run 
consumption response to income shocks. We would therefore expect the consumption response to be 
larger and the wealth/savings response to be smaller for those poorer households and the reverse for 
wealthier households. Note also that due to the limited three year timeframe under consideration we 
empirically treat all shocks as transitory in nature, while controlling for any persistence – with the one 
exception  being  the  death  of  a  family  income  earner.  A  longer  panel  dataset  would  facilitate  an 
empirical  long  run  analysis  of  household  consumption  response  to  both  permanent  and  transitory 
income shocks.  
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where     represents total household food consumption expenditures in period  1,    
   
is a vector of standard consumption explanatory variables including income, wealth 
measures and other relevant household socio-economic characteristics such as age and 
education level of the household head, and     is a statistical noise term.
6 This model 
is estimated using OLS. 
 
In the second step we use the estimated beta coefficients from equation (7) to predict 
household consumption in period  2 using observed data on   in period  2. Income 
reported lost in the period  2 due to adverse shocks is added back in order to capture 
the true ceteris paribus predicted level of consumption. 
 
           
                           (8) 
 
If  households  manage  to  smooth  consumption  then  this  estimated  level  of 
consumption  for  period   2 ,  which  takes  into  account  changes  in  observable 
consumption determinants captured in   (adjusted for income shocks) should be the 
same as the actual observed level of consumption     in period  2. The third step is 
therefore to test the following hypothesis: 
 
  :                               (9) 
 
Failure to reject this hypothesis will provide  evidence of  consumption smoothing. 
This test is performed across different household groupings according to the category 
of shocks suffered, whether savings or formal insurance are present and household 
income levels.  
 
The  second  aspect  of  our  empirical  investigation  explores  the  mechanism  of 
consumption smoothing invoked by the household. Our theoretical model predicts that 
a household will allocate its total savings over asset classes as a function of excess 
returns over the risk-free rate     1   , the coefficient of absolute risk aversion  
 1 
and the variance covariance of asset returns  
 1 (see equation (6)). As such we can 
expect households to allocate total savings (including any precautionary component) 
across a range of different assets to buffer against unexpected income shocks. The 
extent to which they draw down on different types of assets in the event of different 
types of income shocks is an interesting empirical question to explore.  
 
Identifying a causal relationship between the occurrence of an adverse income shock 
and the depletion of the stock of liquid assets is complicated given that the effect of 
the shock may be difficult to separate from other factors that may deplete household 
liquid assets. For example, households that suffer the death of a family member may 
have already begun depleting liquid asset stocks if that household member required 
medical  treatment  for  some  time  in  advance  of  his  or  her  death.  If  the  shock  is 
exogenous, however, this relationship can be identified using a panel fixed-effects 
approach  under  certain  identification  assumptions.  Our  data  facilitate  the 
disaggregation  of  overall  shocks  into  their  exogenous  (spatially  covariant)  and 
                                                 
6 Household  food  consumption  expenditures  represents  the  total  monetary  value  (‘000  VND)  of  a 
selected number of food items consumed during the last four weeks prior to each survey date (adjusted 
to 2010 present values). The expenditure values each year also include food items exchanged, home-
produced or received for free. We are unable to separately quantify these components from the data.  
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idiosyncratic  components.  Exogenous  spatially  covariant  shocks  are  further 
disaggregated  into  1)  economic  (for  example,  crop  price  changes,  key  input  price 
changes/shortages)  and  2)  natural  (for  example,  floods,  typhoons,  droughts  etc) 
components while our raw data motivate the classification of idiosyncratic shocks are 
classified as 3) insurable (for example, illness, injury or death of household member) 
and 4) uninsurable (for example, crime/theft, divorce, family disputes etc).
7 By their 
nature,  idiosyncratic  shocks  may  be  correlated  with  unobserved  household 
characteristics  that  affect  a  household’s  financial  decision  making.  Our  data  lean 
toward estimation approaches within the context of a natural experiment with certain 
important  characteristics,  namely  the  existence  of  multiple  treatment  groups  and 
multiple treatment events in the form of income shocks across time. We select to use 
household  fixed-effects  estimation  as  it  represents  a  generalized  difference-in-
differences approach and accommodates the fact that there is more than one treatment 
group (for example, households can suffer both spatially covariant and idiosyncratic 
income shocks) and more than one treatment time period (households can suffer any 
income shock in any/all time period(s) under consideration). We obtain our fixed-
effects estimates by regressing the outcome variable (each household liquid asset level) 
on the income shock variables, after controlling for year and household fixed effects. 
The full household level fixed effects model we estimate is given by: 
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where       ∑    
 
     represents  the  aggregate  household  liquid  asset  value  under 
consideration  (all  disaggregated     are  adjusted  to  2010  present  values),       , 
       ,          and         are  dummy  variables  indicating  spatially  covariant 
natural and economic and idiosyncratic insurable and uninsurable shocks respectively, 
    represents  a  vector  of  time  variant  household  characteristics  (including  wealth 
levels  which  act  as  a  proxy  for  time  variant  household  risk  aversion  under  our 
assumed  CARA  risk  preferences),    represent  time  dummies,     is  a  household 
specific fixed effect and     is the household random error term. We assume that the 
variance of the spatially covariant risk facing each household,    
  , is subsumed within 
the household fixed effect    together with any regional differences which control for 
insurance supply side variations and asset pricing variations across regions (including 
variance/co-variances of asset returns) while the time dummies    control for average 
changes in asset values over time.
8 Our identifying assumption is that we control for 
all  time  variant  household  characteristics  within  the  empirical  model  while  all 
household time invariant characteristics are subsumed within the household specific 
fixed effect. 
 
Given  our  theoretical  prediction  that  risk-averse  households  fully  insure  the 
idiosyncratic  portion  of  their  risk,  our  model  includes  the  binary  variable        
which indicates whether the household made any insurance claims during the time 
period and an interaction term,                  . This interaction term captures the 
                                                 
7 We treat all rural Vietnamese households within our sample as price takers and control for shadow 
wages through the household income measure. All price shocks are assumed exogenous within this 
context. 
8 We  assume  CARA  over  CRRA  risk  preferences  as  maximizing  expected  utility  of  the  former 
approximates maximizing mean-variance utility which is required for equation (5)  
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effect on household liquid asset levels of those households suffering an idiosyncratic 
and insurable shock and making an insurance claim – while controlling for average 
differences across these households through the level terms,          and       . Our 
hypothesis predicts that the estimated coefficients on both level and interaction terms 
should be significant with the interaction term signaling the degree to which insurance 
serves to ease the depletion of the liquid asset under financial stress. Our analysis is 
further extended to consider the extent to which other risk-coping strategies may serve 
to  lessen  the  depletion  of  liquid  assets.  We  consider  public  and  private  transfers 
through the dummy variable          as an alternative way to smooth the path of 
consumption in the face of an adverse income shock.
9 Government aid programs may 
also act as an important safety net for those households suffering spatially covariant 
natural  shocks  and  this  effect  is  captured  through  the  interaction  term 
      *        . If external transfers help to lessen the depletion of liquid asset 
holdings in the event of an adverse natural shock we would expect the coefficient on 




The  data  are  taken  from  the  Vietnam  Access  to  Resources  Household  Survey 
(VARHS) for 2006, 2008 and 2010 (CIEM et al, 2007; 2009; 2011 Forthcoming). 
This survey was carried out in rural areas of 12 provinces of Vietnam in the summer 
of each year producing a balanced panel of 2,045 households spread over 161 districts 
and 456 communes.
10 The survey was conducted during the same three month period 
each year to ensure consistency and facilitating reasonable comparisons across time. 
The  VARHS  explores  issues  surrounding  Vietnamese  rural  households’  access  to 
resources and the constraints that these households face in managing their livelihoods. 
Along  with  detailed  demographic  information  on  household  members,  the  survey 
includes  sections  on  household  assets,  savings,  credit  (both  formal  and  informal), 
formal insurance, shocks and risk-coping, informal safety nets and the structure of 
social capital. The full set of explanatory variables used in this analysis is described in 
Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In this paper, we are interested in using the empirical model given in equation (10) to 
test the responsiveness of each household’s liquid asset class under consideration to 
exposure to spatially covariant and idiosyncratic shocks. Before doing so we present a 
range  of  summary  statistics  that  help  to  provide  further  motivation  for  our  core 
research  questions.  Households  are  asked  to  rank  the  shocks  suffered  in  order  of 
importance and to provide an associated monetary loss in terms of Vietnamese Dong 
(VND). Table 2a provides a more detailed breakdown of income shocks and their sub-
categories while Table 2b considers a disaggregation across wealth groups. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
9 Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the  Vietnamese  government  provides  assistance  via  transfer 
payments to households severely affected by natural disasters. We cannot directly identify from the raw 
data, the purpose behind any transfer income. 
10 The  survey  was  developed  by  the  Development  Economics  Research  Group,  Department  of 




We  find  that  that  56  per  cent  of  households  suffered  an  adverse  income  shock 
between 2006 and 2008 while 50 per cent suffered an income shock between 2008 
and 2010. At a disaggregated level, in 2008 we find that 13 per cent of households 
suffered an idiosyncratic shock only while 73 per cent suffered an exogenous spatially 
covariant shock only thus providing some support toward the dominance of spatially 
covariant over idiosyncratic shocks. In 2010, spatially covariant shocks also dominate 
idiosyncratic shocks by 71 per cent to 13 per cent, respectively. In 2008, 45 per cent 
of households report that they fully recovered from the income shocks with recovery 
less  likely  where  households  experience  both  spatially  covariant  and  idiosyncratic 
shocks.
11 In  2010,  53  per  cent  of  households  report  that  they  fully  recover  from 
shocks.  Disaggregating  the  household  shock  recovery  data  across  wealth  groups 
(Table 2b) reveals that in 2008, 47 per cent of households in the highest wealth group 
recovered from adverse income shocks compared with 41 per cent from the lowest 
wealth group. In 2010, the corresponding proportion of households that recovered was 
62  and  44  per  cent,  respectively.  These  recovery  data  suggest  that  while  income 
shocks are problematic for households across each wealth group, recovery is more 
difficult for poorer households. 
 
These  summary  statistics  help  further  motivate  the  central  questions  of  this  paper 
concerning household risk-coping mechanisms and their effectiveness. To further aid 
our understanding of households’ risk coping strategies we estimate a simple probit 
model of the determinants of household recovery from shocks. We consider whether 
the household holds liquid assets in the form of savings, livestock, crops stores and 
loans together with other relevant wealth controls. The results are presented in the 
Appendix (Table A1). Although all shocks captured within the survey are transitory 
by  definition  (with  the  exception  of  the  death  of  a  household  member),  if  the 
household  is  affected  by  a  succession  of  transitory  shocks  these  could  have  a 
persistent effect across the short timeframe under consideration. We control for the 
persistence  of  shocks  by  including  the  total  number  of  shocks  suffered  by  the 
household.
12 As expected, the total number of shocks suffered has a negative effect on 
the likelihood of recovery in both the 2008 and 2010 cross-sections. Having voluntary 
insurance has a positive and significant influence on the likelihood of recovery in both 
2008 and 2010.
13 We find that households suffering from an idiosyncratic shock are 
less likely to recover while those suffering spatially covariant natural shocks are more 
likely  to  recover.  This  result  is  evident  in  both  2008  and  2010  and  suggests  that 
external factors (for example, government transfers) may help to alleviate the adverse 
impacts of natural shocks for these households. This issue is explored further in the 
empirical section. We find that households with savings and livestock holdings are 
more  likely  to  recover  in  2008  although  this  relationship  is  not  evident  in  2010. 
Successful recovery from prior shocks does not significantly impact on the likelihood 
of  recovery  from  current  income  shocks  in  both  years.  This  descriptive  analysis 
allows  us  to  profile  the  households  that  recover  from  shocks  and  reveals  that 
insurance and liquid assets may be important risk coping instruments. 
 
                                                 
11 Households are asked whether they have fully recovered from the effects of the adverse shock(s) 
suffered during the current timeframe and this measure is therefore subjective. 
12 We also included a dummy variable representing a shock from the death of a family member which 
was statistically insignificant and so was excluded. 
13 We also disaggregate the recovery profile by wealth groups and find that voluntary insurance has a 
positive effect on recovery across all groups. Results available on request.  
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Tables 3a to 3c describe the liquid asset holdings of households and how they are 
accumulated or depleted for households that experience shocks. As revealed in Table 
3a we find that the proportion of households with savings increased between 2006 and 
2010 from 61 per cent to 72 per cent of households.
14 The proportion of households 
with other types of liquid asset holdings is relatively similar in each year while the 
proportion of households with loans fell between 2006 and 2010. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 3a, 3b AND 3c ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3b details the change in the average value of different types of liquid asset 
holdings  of  households  between  2006  and  2008  disaggregated  by  whether  the 
household experienced a shock or not. Table 3c details these changes between 2008 
and 2010. Households that suffered a shock between 2006 and 2008 reduced their 
savings by an average of 1 million VND while households that did not suffer a shock 
increased their savings levels. In contrast, between 2008 and 2010, all households 
increase  their  savings  levels  on  average,  but  households  suffering  from  shocks 
increase their stock of savings by less than those not suffering. We also find that the 
amount  of  loans  outstanding  increases  for  households  that  suffer  shocks  which 
suggests that households may turn to credit in times of financial stress. 
 
The household shock recovery profile presented in Table A1 suggests that formal 
insurance  protects  against  idiosyncratic  risk  as  is  consistent  with  our  theoretical 
predictions. In recent years, the Vietnamese formal insurance sector has experienced 
substantial growth in terms of market penetration.
15 The raw data reveal that although 
no  insurance  products  are  available  to  the  VARHS  participants  against  spatially 
covariant risks, insurance for forms of idiosyncratic risk is held by 61 per cent of 
households in 2010 (see Table 4). Of the 61 per cent of households holding formal 
insurance,  84  per  cent  of  these  hold  voluntary  insurance  contracts.  Among  the 
categories of formal insurance listed in the survey, health insurance schemes (12 per 
cent) and education insurance (15 per cent) schemes have the highest participation 
rates.  In  contrast,  no  households  in  our  sample  hold  fire  insurance.  Moreover, 
insurance  against  spatially  covariant  risk  (for  example,  rainfall  insurance)  is  not 
available to households in our sample. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We also estimate a simple probit model of voluntary insurance participation as a guide 
to the profile of households holding voluntary insurance in both 2008 and 2010. The 
results  are  presented  in  the  Appendix  (Table  A2).  Although  subject  to  potential 
endogeneity bias with respect to unobserved heterogeneous risk aversion (and other 
factors), the results suggest that educated households are more likely to hold formal 
insurance. Household wealth, which proxies risk aversion, also has a positive effect, 
while the size of the household is also positively associated with the likelihood of 
having insurance. The impact of income shocks, expressed as the total number of 
shocks suffered in the period, decreases the likelihood of insurance purchase in 2008 
only while savings stocks increase the likelihood of purchase in both periods. Overall, 
observations  from  the  raw  insurance  data  suggest  that  although  61  per  cent  of 
                                                 
14 In 2008 only 52 per cent of households had savings which may reflect that difficult year that many 
rural households in Vietnam had in 2008 due to the food price crisis and inflation which followed. 
15 The Knowledge Centre forecast formal insurance market growth of 12% between 2007 and 2011.  
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households hold insurance (with 84 per cent of these holding voluntary instruments) 
for idiosyncratic risk, other forms of risk-coping such as saving and borrowing remain 
important. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
In  order  to  test  the  theoretical  predictions  developed  in  Section  2  our  empirical 
strategy is two-fold. First, we focus on consumption responses to adverse shocks to 
gain  an  understanding  of  the  extent  to  which  households  manage  to  smooth  their 
consumption over time and whether this relates to their holdings of liquid assets and 
formal insurance. Second, we examine the depletion of household liquid assets in 
response  to  adverse  income  shocks  to  determine  whether  these  assets  serve 
precautionary or self-insurance purposes. Taken together, these steps should help us to 
gain  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  important  risk-coping  strategies  within  rural 
Vietnam and their effectiveness. 
 
5.1 Consumption Smoothing 
On the basis of subjective responses to coping with income shocks, 54 per cent of 
households  indicate  reducing  consumption  is  the  most  important  risk-coping 
mechanism.  In  addition,  25  per  cent  of  households  report  that  they  increase 
borrowings and sell assets. In contrast, our theoretical model predicts that households 
will fully insure against idiosyncratic risk and will use precautionary savings to buffer 
against spatially covariant shocks. As such, we predict that households should smooth 
consumption over time regardless of whether they suffer an income shock or not.
16 To 
test whether this is the case, first, a consumption function for 2006 is estimated, the 
results of which are presented in Table A3 of the Appendix. Second, the estimated 
coefficients are used to predict consumption for 2008 using the observed data on the 
explanatory variables for 2008.
17 Third, t-tests of the difference between actual levels 
of consumption in 2008 and the predicted consumption values are conducted. These 
tests are conducted at median rather than mean values to alleviate any extreme value 
distortions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis provides evidence of consumption 
smoothing.  Significantly  positive  (negative)  t-statistics  indicate  that  the  estimated 
value is significantly lower (higher) than the actual suggesting that actual observed 
consumption  is  higher  (lower)  than  expected.  The  same  consumption  smoothing 
analysis is then conducted between 2008 and 2010. Tables 5a and 5b detail the results 
of  the  t-tests  across  different  household  groupings  according  to  income  levels, 
category  of  shocks,  the  presence  of  formal  insurance  and  other  liquid  savings 
instruments. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 5a AND 5b ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
16 As per Alderman and Paxson (1994), we distinguish between ex ante and ex post risk reduction. 
Insurance and precautionary savings are ex post risk management instruments and are used to help 
households to smooth consumption over time. In contrast, ex ante risk reduction means undertaking 
activities  that  reduce  the  probability  of  the  shock  occurring  (e.g.  safer  investments)  and  can  be 
considered as ‘income smoothing’ activities. 
17 As discussed previously, for the estimated consumption calculation, income earned during 2008 is 
adjusted  for  the  2008  realized  shock  amount  in  order  to  generate  a  more  accurate  consumption 
prediction based on ceteris paribus effects. This adjustment is also applied in generating the estimated 
consumption calculation in 2010.  
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The first group we consider are households that did not experience any shocks and we 
use  2008  for  the  baseline  analysis.  The  results  of  the  t-tests  (row  1  of  Table  5a) 
indicate that actual consumption is significantly larger than estimated consumption 
indicating that households that suffered no income shocks consume even more than 
predicted using the 2006 model. The second row of Table 5a compares the actual and 
predicted consumption levels of households that suffered any classification of ‘severe’ 
income  shock  in  2008  (either  exogenous  or  idiosyncratic  or  both).  We  find  a 
significant  negative  difference  indicating  that  these  households  consume  less  than 
predicted and so do not manage to smooth consumption across the timeframe under 
consideration. While our 2006 consumption model may not perfectly predict 2008 
consumption levels, it does suggest that finding actual consumption levels that are 
significantly less than the levels predicted using our model may even under-estimate 
the extent of the fall in consumption as a result of the shock as compared with other 
households. It is also worth noting that the consumption model is a cross-sectional 
analysis  using  actual  household  income  rather  than  permanent  income  which 
empirically  results  in  marginal  propensity  to  consume  (MPC)  estimates  that  are 
smaller in magnitude than the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) predicts.
18 
 
We disaggregate households that suffer any ‘severe’ shock into those that have no 
formal voluntary insurance and households that have formal voluntary insurance. We 
find no significant difference between actual and estimated consumption levels for 
households  with  formal  insurance,  while  those  with  no  insurance  consume 
significantly  less  than  predicted.  Although  this  result  may  suggest  that  formal 
insurance is an important mechanism for smoothing consumption when faced with a 
‘severe’  income  shock  it  may  simply  be  capturing  the  fact  that  the  consumption 
smoothing households have better planning capacities as evidenced by their selecting 
to purchase formal insurance. We cannot, however, disentangle these effects using our 
approach. We also consider the consumption smoothing capabilities of households 
suffering a ‘severe’ shock across various levels of liquid asset holdings. We consider 
savings, livestock and crop stores and divide households into those with above and 
below median levels in each case. For savings and livestock holdings, our results 
suggest that while consumption smoothing is problematic for households with above 
and below median asset values, the differential is slightly reduced with above median 
asset holdings. Crop stores appear to be significantly correlated with consumption 
smoothing  in  2008.  Focussing  now  on  income  groups,  our  results  indicate  that 
households with below median income levels do not manage to consumption smooth 
when  faced  with  a  ‘severe’  income  shock  while  households  with  above  median 
incomes also record lower actual consumption levels, but to a slightly lesser extent. 
Overall, only insurance and crop stores appear to significantly assist households with 
consumption  smoothing  in  the  face  of  any  ‘severe’  income  shock  and  only  the 
insurance result is preserved across both the 2008 and 2010 cross-sections (see also 
row 2 of Table 5b). 
 
Idiosyncratic  shocks,  both  insurable  and  uninsurable,  do  not  cause  significant 
reductions in actual consumption over predicted levels (row 4 of Table 5a), however 
                                                 
18 The general consumption function was also estimated across household income quintiles and the 
MPC estimates in all cases are of a similar magnitude to the main estimation. This provides support for 
the PIH constant MPC theory (notwithstanding that these results are extremely small in magnitude, 
possibly due to their cross-sectional nature and the fact that the consumption amount is a monthly 
measure). Results are available upon request.  
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significant reductions in consumption are reported in 2010 (row 4 of Table 5b). As 
before,  we  find  those  households  holding  no  formal  insurance  record  significant 
shortfalls  between  actual  and  predicted  consumption  amounts  while  households 
holding formal insurance record no significant differences.
19 This positive relationship 
between insurance and consumption is also evident in 2010 (row 4 of Table 4b). We 
now consider whether the presence of savings instruments, livestock holdings and 
crop stores influence consumption smoothing in the face of idiosyncratic shocks and 
we find no significant pattern in 2008. Surprisingly, households with below and above 
median income levels suffering an idiosyncratic shock suffer no significant reductions 
in consumption in 2008 while significant reductions are recorded in 2010. However, 
in the latter case income appears to cushion consumption shortfalls. 
 
There  is  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  insurance  has  any  relationship  with  the 
consumption smoothing abilities of households that experience exogenous spatially 
covariant shocks (row 3 of Table 5a). This helps support to our hypothesis that formal 
insurance has no effect when coping with exogenous spatially covariant shocks. We 
find that in both 2008 and 2010, across all categories of liquid assets, there is no clear 
pattern emerging regarding the effectiveness of assets in consumption smoothing in 
the face of exogenous spatially covariant shocks. We also find contradicting patterns 
with  crop  stores  and  savings  whereby  households  with  below  median  savings 
consume significantly more than predicted. One possible explanation is that where 
natural  disasters  occur  in  farming  communities  the  government  often  steps  in  to 
provide financial assistance to the poorest of those affected. Our results suggest that, 
if this is the case, this support may, in fact, lead to higher consumption levels than 
would have been the case, even in the absence of the natural disaster. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that the ability of households in rural Vietnam to cope 
when  faced  with  any  category  of  adverse  income  shock  is  highly  correlated  with 
whether they have formal insurance while the magnitude of consumption shortfalls 
may also be alleviated to a small extent by savings instruments (for example, crop 
stores,  savings)  and  income  levels.  Faced  with  idiosyncratic  shocks,  there  is  no 
consistent  pattern  regarding  the  effectiveness  of  savings  instruments  while  formal 
insurance appears to significantly and consistently assist with consumption smoothing. 
These inconsistencies regarding the effectiveness of savings instruments may arise 
due to the fact that risk materializes over time which may also cause a households’ 
ability to cope with the adverse consequences of an income shock to change over time. 
Our  results  are  also  suggestive  of  incomplete  formal  insurance  markets  for 
idiosyncratic risk.
20 Consumption responses to exogenous spatially covariant shocks 
do  not  appear  to  be  correlated  with  formal  insurance.  These  results,  while 
inconclusive,  suggest  that  existing  risk-coping  mechanisms  are  failing  to  smooth 
consumption for many households. This provides us with an important motivation for 
the  second  part  of  our  empirical  investigation,  namely  to  explore  household  risk-
coping mechanisms in more detail. 
 
                                                 
19 We treat this result with caution due to the aforementioned selection bias, but also given that the 
number of observations is extremely small (19). 
20 These market imperfections may also be indicative of other factors, for example lack of trust in 
formal institutions, prohibitive costs of acquiring knowledge about insurance products, peer effects, 
premium pricing etc. A more detailed investigation into these potential effects is beyond the current 
scope of this paper.  
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5.2 Total Liquid Assets 
We now turn our attention away from consumption responses toward asset responses 
in the face of income shocks which is the central theme of our analysis (of which 
formal insurance is an important component). To explore this aspect of risk coping we 
estimate  the  model  presented  in  Equation  (10).  For  each  asset  class  under 
consideration (total liquid assets, savings, livestock, crop stores and loans), we use 
fixed effects estimation to regress the level of household asset holdings (expressed in 
million VND) in each year against our measures of exogenous spatially covariant and 
idiosyncratic shocks together with income controls, wealth controls and household 
composition  changes.  All  value  variables  expressed  are  adjusted  to  2010  present 
values.  Income  shocks  are  disaggregated  by  exogenous  natural  and  economic  and 
idiosyncratic, insurable and uninsurable. We also include a dummy variable to control 
for external public and private transfers together with a dummy variable to control for 
actual formal insurance claims. We focus explicitly on whether the household made 
voluntary insurance claims (health or life) as these specific claims closely align with 
our category of idiosyncratic insurable shocks. 
 
First,  we  determine  whether  households  suffering  any  type  of  income  shock 
experience a statistically significant reduction in asset levels. Second, we disaggregate 
the income shock measure into its exogenous and idiosyncratic components to explore 
how  each  specific  category  of  shock  influences  asset  levels  over  time.  Third,  we 
interact  insurance  claims  and  transfers  with  the  incidence  of  shocks  to  establish 
whether  they  help  to  reduce  the  impact  of  shocks  on  asset  depletion.  We  also 
disaggregate our results by wealth group to establish the extent to which the poor are 
particularly  vulnerable.  Controls  for  income,  household  size,  gender  of  household 
head, age of the household head and age squared (to capture any lifecycle effects), 
wealth (net of liquid assets), recovery from prior shocks (to control for persistence) 
and  time  dummies  (to  control  for  average  changes  in  asset  values  over  time)  are 
included. 
 
We first consider whether a household’s stock  of total liquid assets (including all 
savings,  livestock  and  crops  stores)  is  responsive  to  adverse  income  shocks.  The 
results are presented in Table 6.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Column (1) reveals that shocks have a negative impact on the accumulation of total 
liquid  assets.  Insurance  claims  and  external  transfers  have  no  significant  effect. 
Disaggregating the income shock into its exogenous and idiosyncratic components 
(Column 2) we find that both types of shock have a negative impact on the value of 
liquid asset. A further breakdown of the type of shock (Columns 3 and 4) reveals that 
while  both  exogenous  economic  and  idiosyncratic  insurable  shocks  are  serving  to 
deplete total liquid asset values over time, the idiosyncratic insurable shocks have less 
of  an  impact.  We  find  that  total  liquid  asset  levels  respond  negatively  and 
significantly to exogenous economic shocks providing some evidence in support of 
our  primary  hypothesis  that  household  total  liquid  assets  may  serve  precautionary 
savings purposes.
21 Interacting formal insurance claims with idiosyncratic insurable 
                                                 
21 We cannot disentangle the precise amount of total liquid assets which was originally intended to 
serve precautionary savings purposes from the amount serving other inter-temporal purposes.  
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shocks (Column 5) and interacting external transfers with exogenous natural shocks 
(Column 6) has no significant effect on the level of liquid assets. 
 
In  relation  to  our  control  variables  we  find  that  household  lifecycle  effects  are 
significant in the direction that we expect while income and wealth are positive and 
significant.  Disaggregating  our  sample  into  three  wealth  groups  and  funning  the 
model  separately  for  each  group  we  find  that  exogenous  economic  shocks  are 
important for the highest wealth group while idiosyncratic insurable shocks are more 
problematic for the lowest wealth group.
22 
 
5.3 Livestock Holdings 
To  understand  whether  livestock  serves  as  a  buffer  against  adverse  shocks  we 
estimate a fixed effects regression of livestock holdings values against our exogenous 
spatially  covariant  and  idiosyncratic  shock  measures.  The  results  are  presented  in 
Table 7. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that livestock acts as a buffer against overall income 
shocks  (Column  1).  Disaggregating  income  shocks  into  their  exogenous  and 
idiosyncratic  components  we  find  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  between 
idiosyncratic  shocks  and  the  value  of  livestock  holdings  (Column  2).  There  is  no 
evidence to suggest, however, that livestock acts as a buffer against spatially covariant 
shocks. These findings support the partial equilibrium effects discussed in Fafchamps 
et  al  (1998)  whereby  if  livestock  markets  are  not  perfectly  integrated  then  it  is 
difficult for this asset class to act as a buffer stock in the case of exogenous spatially 
covariant shocks. In such closed market situations, net sales of livestock must sum to 
zero at the commune/village level. Idiosyncratic insurable shocks, on the other hand, 
facilitate the use of livestock as a risk-coping mechanism and we see some evidence 
that this is the case (Column 4). Turning our attention to formal insurance effects, we 
find that insurance claims are negatively related to total livestock values (Columns 1 
to 4). The interaction between whether the households makes an insurance claim with 
whether the household suffered an idiosyncratic insurable shocks has a positive and 
significant  effect  on  total  livestock  values.  This  suggests  that  while  households 
suffering  an  idiosyncratic  insurable  shock  and  making  formal  insurance  claims 
deplete their livestock holdings on average, households suffering from such shocks 
and claiming formal insurance do so to a lesser extent. In fact, the magnitude of the 
coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  almost  cancels  out  the  negative  effect  of 
idiosyncratic shocks. This indicates that while households who suffer idiosyncratic 
insurable income shocks rely on livestock to act as a buffer, those that make insurance 
claims do not. When the sample is disaggregated by wealth group we find that our 
results  are  consistent  across  the  lowest  and  middle  wealth  groups.
23 We  find  no 
evidence that external transfers act in any way to preserve livestock holdings. 
 
Overall, our results provide some support for the hypothesis that livestock plays an 
important role in consumption smoothing where idiosyncratic insurable shocks occur 
but not for exogenous spatially covariant shocks (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find 
                                                 
22 The results of the separate regressions for different wealth groups are not presented in Table 6 due to 
space constraints but are available on request. 
23 These results are not shown for ease of illustration but are available from the authors upon request.  
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a similar result). We also some evidence that insurance plays an important role in 
eliminating the need for households to deplete livestock holdings in the event of an 
idiosyncratic insurable shock. 
 
5.4 Financial Savings 
We estimate a similar model of the responsiveness of a household’s total stock of 
savings to exogenous spatially covariant and idiosyncratic shocks. We also consider a 
disaggregation  of  the  total  stock  of  savings  into  formal  savings  (with  financial 
institutions), informal savings and cash/gold stores to determine whether households 
demonstrate preferences to preserve certain savings stocks in the event of different 
categories of shock. The results pertaining to total savings stocks are presented in 
Table 8. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We find that the occurrence of an income shock depletes a household’s stock of total 
savings over time (Column 1). Disaggregating income shocks by type we find that 
while  both  exogenous  spatially  covariant  and  idiosyncratic  shocks  are  important 
(Column 2), spatially covariant natural shocks have the greatest impact (Columns 3 & 
4). Also of note is the average negative effect on savings of households in receipt of 
external  transfers  which  suggests  that  these  households  are  experiencing  some 
financial  difficulty.  Although  total  savings  stocks  are  depleted  on  average  by 
households  suffering  natural  shocks  and  by  those  households  in  receipt  of  cash 
transfers, when transfers are interacted with natural shocks (Column 6) we find that 
those households in receipt of transfers do so to a lesser extent. We interpret this 
result as providing some evidence regarding the importance of external transfers in 
times of natural disaster, notwithstanding that the magnitude of this assistance appears 
not  to  fully  compensate  for  the  total  financial  loss  incurred  by  the  household. 
Households  suffering  idiosyncratic  insurable  shocks  save  less  as  do  households 
claiming formal insurance. There is no evidence, however, that insurance claims serve 
as a buffer to preserve savings stocks in times of financial stress (Column 5).
24 When 
disaggregated by wealth group we find that our model fits best for the highest wealth 
group.
25 Overall,  we  have  some  evidence  that  total  savings  serve  precautionary 
savings purposes due to their responsiveness to spatially covariant natural shocks.
26 
External transfers also emerge as a potentially important risk-coping mechanism.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Disaggregating total savings into its various components also reveals some interesting 
findings, particularly for cash/gold held at home (see Table 8a). We find that both 
natural  disasters  and  idiosyncratic  insurable  shocks  deplete  households’  stock  of 
cash/gold held at home. As for the total stock of saving, we find that transfers feature 
significantly as a risk-coping mechanism in the face of natural disasters although there 
is still a shortfall in terms of financial loss for the household. Insurance claims do not 
serve to ease the depletion of cash/gold in the face of idiosyncratic insurable shocks. 
This  complimentarity  between  insurance  and  savings  instruments  suggests  that 
                                                 
24 We find no evidence that insurance claims assist with natural disasters. 
25 Result not presented but available on request. 
26 As before, we cannot disentangle the precautionary component of total savings from other inter-
temporal or bequest components.  
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insurance markets may be incomplete. We find no significant evidence that either 




5.5 Crop storage 
Crop  stores  in  the  form  of  rice,  maize,  potatoes  etc.,  may  also  act  as  a  form  of 
precautionary saving.
28 Results of the impact of exogenous spatially covariant and 
idiosyncratic on the store of crops are presented in Table 9. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The  results  indicate  that  total  crop  stores  are  not  responsive  to  idiosyncratic  or 
spatially covariant shocks (Column 1). This result is robust to the disaggregation of 
spatially  covariant  and  idiosyncratic  shocks  into  their  constituent  components. 
Disaggregating by wealth group we find that for middle wealth groups (Column 3), 
exogenous economic shocks together with idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks serve to 
deplete household crop stores. Given that exogenous economic shocks include price 
falls then it is not surprising that households may need to sell more crops to their local 
intermediary  in  the  event  of  such  a  shock.  For  households  that  suffered  an 
idiosyncratic uninsurable shock, risk-coping may simply require that more harvest is 
domestically consumed to offset the financial loss incurred. Exogenous natural shocks 
deplete the crop stores of households in the highest wealth group (Column 4). 
 
Overall, we find some evidence that crop stores are drawn down in times of financial 
stress from uninsurable exogenous and idiosyncratic losses and thus appear to serve 
precautionary  savings  purposes.  Given  that  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  rural 
Vietnamese households do not have the means to store large quantities of their crops 
(due to the small scale of their production and a lack of storage facilities), it is not 
surprising that we find no evidence that crop stores are used a risk-coping mechanism 
for the poor. 
 
5.6 Household Borrowing 
Finally, we turn our attention to rural credit markets (both informal and formal) and 
test whether the existence of credit instruments (or negative assets) serves as a risk-
coping mechanism for rural Vietnamese households. According to Dercon (2002), 
credit  and  insurance  markets  in  developing  economies  are  typically  absent  or 
incomplete,  either  for  good  theoretical  reasons  or  as  a  result  of  bad  policy  (for 
surveys, see Bell (1988) or Besley (1994, 1995)). Typically, consumption loans are 
also rare. We use a fixed effects estimation to regress the total outstanding household 
loan  amounts  against  measures  of  spatially  covariant  and  idiosyncratic  shocks  to 
determine  whether  the  household  resorts  to  borrowing  to  facilitate  consumption 
smoothing when faced with adverse income shocks. The results are presented in Table 
10. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
27 The results for formal and informal savings are not presented but are available on request. 
28 Park (2005) finds that the joint nature of production and savings decisions limits the income loss 
associated with risk-coping, and the desire to store grain can explain why subsistence households are 
frequently net purchasers but rarely net sellers of grain.  
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We find that total household loan amounts are positively and significantly responsive 
to adverse income shocks, indicating that households increase borrowing in times of 
financial hardship (Column 1). We disaggregate income shocks into their constituent 
components and find that both exogenous and idiosyncratic shocks are associated with 
higher levels of borrowing (Column 2). A further disaggregation of income shocks 
suggests that all types of shocks significantly increase household borrowing (Columns 
3  and  4).  It  appears  that  rural  Vietnamese  households  resort  to  increasing  their 
borrowings  in  times  of  financial  stress.  We  do  not  find  any  evidence  that  formal 
insurance claims or external transfers help to ease households’ debt burden. 
 
Recovery from previous income shocks serves to reduce the outstanding loan amount 
of the household and this result is robust to all classifications of income shock and 
associated  interaction  terms.  Lifecycle  effects  also  appear  dominant  whereby  a 
curvilinear relationship exists between household loans outstanding and the age of the 
household head. Disaggregating by wealth group we find that the reliance on credit in 
times of financial hardship is most characteristic of wealthier households who are 





In this paper, we examine the consequences of risk on households ex post behaviour 
by examining both the consumption and asset depletion responses of households to 
the incidence of adverse income shocks. We begin by developing a theoretical model 
which predicts that in the presence of complete insurance markets households will 
insure against idiosyncratic risk and precautionary save to protect against uninsurable 
spatially covariant risk. We test the hypotheses proposed by our model using a unique 
panel dataset of rural Vietnamese households for the period 2006 to 2010. Vietnam 
represents  an  interesting  illustrative  case  study  given  the  recent  development  of 
formal  rural  financial  markets,  which  has  significantly  increased  access  to  formal 
financial products by rural households, coupled with a high incidence level of adverse 
income shocks. To our knowledge this is the first empirical case study which has 
considered  the  ex  post  responses  of  households  to  negative  income  shocks  where 
information on both formal insurance and savings instruments is available.  
 
We  begin  by  analysing  the  extent  to  which  households  manage  to  smooth 
consumption  over  time.  We  categorize  shocks  as  idiosyncratic  and  exogenous 
spatially covariant shocks with the former insurable in formal financial markets and 
the latter non-insurable, thereby creating a theoretical motive for precautionary saving. 
Our results suggest that the ability of households in rural Vietnam to cope when faced 
with adverse income shocks is highly correlated with their level of total liquid assets 
and their levels of income and wealth. 
 
We follow our consumption smoothing analysis by examining whether liquid asset 
holdings in the form of savings stocks, livestock holdings, crop stores and borrowings 
are  directly  responsive  to  adverse  shocks  thereby  serving  precautionary  savings 
purposes. A key component of our analysis focuses on the distinctive role of formal 
insurance  claims  in  smoothing  household  consumption  in  the  face  of  adverse 
                                                 
29 The disaggregation by wealth group is not presented due to space constraints but the results are 
available on request.  
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idiosyncratic insurable income shocks. We also consider whether external transfers 
act as an important risk-coping mechanism in the face of spatially covariant natural 
shocks. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that households deplete their total stock of liquid assets in 
response to exogenous economic shocks and idiosyncratic insurable shocks. Financial 
savings, particularly cash and gold held at home act as important buffers in the face of 
spatially covariant natural shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks also impact on the stock of 
total savings but to a lesser extent than for exogenous shocks. This is consistent with 
our  hypothesis  that  households  insure  against  idiosyncratic  risk  but  require 
precautionary  savings  to  smooth  consumption  in  the  event  of  spatially  covariant 
uninsurable losses. Insurance markets appear to play an important role in easing the 
depletion  of  livestock  holdings  in  response  to  idiosyncratic  shocks  while  external 
transfers are important for risk-coping in the face of natural disasters. We also find 
evidence, however, that insurance markets do not fully cover idiosyncratic risks. This 
is  evidenced  by  savings  (especially  cash/gold  stores)  playing  an  important  role  in 
consumption smoothing in the event of idiosyncratic shocks, even when controlling 
for  insurance  claims.  Borrowing  is  increased  when  households  are  faced  with 
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Table 1: Explanatory Variables and descriptions 
Explanatory Variable  Description 
Exogenous: Spatially Covariant 
Natural Shock 
Dummy variable indicating whether the household has suffered a 
spatially  covariant  natural  income  shock.  Shocks  include  floods, 
landslides, typhoons, storms, droughts, pest infestation, crop disease 
and avian flu. 
Exogenous: Economic Shock  Dummy variable indicating whether the household has suffered an 
exogenous economic shock. Shocks include changes in crop price, 
changes  in  key  input  prices,  changes  in  prices  of  food  or  other 
essential commodities consumed. 
Idiosyncratic: Insurable Shock  Dummy variable indicating whether the household has suffered an 
idiosyncratic insurable income shock. Shocks include illness, injury 
or death of a family member. 
Idiosyncratic: Uninsurable Shock  Dummy variable indicating whether the household has suffered an 
idiosyncratic  uninsurable  income  shock.  Shocks  include 
unemployment,  unsuccessful  investment,  loss  of  land, 
crime/robbery/theft, divorce, family disputes. 
Transfers  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  household  has  received 
external  income  transfers  from  government  and/or  family 
members/relatives (public/private sources). 
Insurance Claim  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  household  has  made  an 
insurance  claim  and  received  funds  in  compensation.  Claims  are 
restricted to health and life insurance. 
Income  Household income – includes income from non-farm activities and 
income from the sale of assets. Excludes insurance premium paid. 
(2010 mean = 80991 VND, 2010 std deviation=130050 VND) 
Household Size  Total number of household members. 
Education of Household Head  1 "Cannot read and write" 
2 "Can read & write but did not finish primary school" 
3 "Finished primary school"  
4 "Finished lower secondary school"  
5 "Finished upper secondary school" 
 6 "Third Level" 
Gender of Household Head  Dummy variable (1 Male, 0 Female). 
Age of Household Head  Measured in years. 
Wealth 
 
Total household wealth constructed using fixed asset values (land), 
liquid asset values (livestock, savings, crop stores), housing values , 
equipment  and  machinery  and  consumer  durables.  Liquid  Asset 
values are excluded for the purposes of the analysis. 
(2010 mean = 351658 VND, 2010 std deviation=1365008 VND) 
Recovered from Prior Shocks  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  household  has  recovered 
from a prior income shock in the previous time period. 
 
 
Table 2a: Household Shocks and Recovery Statistics 
  2008  2008  2010  2010 
Shock   % Households  % Recovered  % Households  % Recovered 
Any Shock  56%  45%  50%   53%  
   Spatially covariant only  73%  48%  71%   57%  
   Idiosyncratic only  13%  49%  13%   38%  
   Both  13%  30%  16%   60%  
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Table 2b: Income Shocks, Recovery and Voluntary Insurance coverage 
  2008  2008  2008  2010  2010  2010 


















Shock  57%  61%  51%  50%  55%  47% 
Recovered  41%  49%  47%  44%  52%  62% 
Insured  32%  41%  59%  30%  52%  69% 
 
 
Table 3a: Household Liquid Asset Holdings by % of Households 
  Savings  Livestock  Crops  Loans 
2006  61%  77%  71%  54% 
2008  52%  68%  69%  41% 
2010  72%  69%  69%  45% 
 
 
Table 3b: Household average asset changes between 2006 and 2008 (‘000 VND) 
  Save  Save  Live  Live  Crops  Crop  Loan  Loan 
  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock 
Change  3,482  -1,078  5,755  8,053  1,890  3,787  23  3,906 
 
 
Table 3c: Household average asset changes between 2008 and 2010 (‘000 VND) 
  Save  Save  Live  Live  Crops  Crop  Loan  Loan 
  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock  No Shock  Shock 
Change  7,923  3,715  -1,054  -1,903  -2,902  -1,859  -1,718  2,103 
 
 
Table 4: Household Insurance in 2010 
  Total  Volunt.  Farm  Fire  Life  Social  Health  Educat.  Other 
% with ins.  61%  84%  1%  0%  9%  8%  12%  15%  61% 





Table 5a: Results of sample median tests for the difference between actual and predicted consumption in 2008 
  Overall  No Insur.  With Insur.  <Med Save  >Med 
Save 





























































































































Table 5b: Results of sample median tests for the difference between actual and predicted consumption in 2010 

































































































































Notes for 5a and 5b: A shock is defined as having suffered an income loss of greater than 25 per cent of 2008 and 2010 annual income respectively. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
The number of observations are presented in parenthesis. 
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Table 6: Fixed effects estimates of the impact of income shocks on Total Liquid Asset 
Holdings 














Income Shock  -0.1661*** 
(0.0508) 
         
Exogenous Shock    -0.0986** 
(0.0497) 
       
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 






















     
Idiosyncratic: 
Insurable Shock 
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(0.0792) 














        0.1587 
(0.1748) 
 























































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













2  0.1528  0.1531  0.1538  0.1533  0.1533  0.1533 
N  5775  5775  5775  5775  5775  5775 












Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 7: Fixed effects estimates of the impact of income shocks on Total Livestock 
Holdings 














Income Shock  -0.0344 
(0.0733) 
         
Exogenous Shock    0.0230 
(0.0664) 
      - 
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 






















     
Idiosyncratic: 
Insurable Shock 
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(0.1178) 














        0.6319** 
(0.2698) 
 






















































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













2  0.2276  0.2300  0.2295  0.2300  0.2294  0.2291 
N  4377  4377  4377  4377  4377  4377 












Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 8: Fixed effects estimates of the impact of income shocks on Total Savings 














Income Shock  -0.2427*** 
(0.0703) 
         
Exogenous Shock    -0.1909***. 
(0.0675) 
      - 
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 






















     
Idiosyncratic: 
Insurable Shock 




























          0.2063* 
(0.1095) 














        -0.0135 
(0.2363) 
 






















































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













2  0.1974  0.1986  0.1980  0.1974  0.1973  0.1956 
N  3791  3791  3791  3791  3791  3791 












Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table  8a:  Fixed  effects  estimates  of  the  impact  of  adverse  income  shocks  on 
Cash/Gold Held at Home 














Income Shock  -0.2533*** 
(0.0725) 
         
Exogenous Shock    -0.1736**. 
(0.0698) 
      - 
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 






















     
Idiosyncratic: 
Insurable Shock 
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(0.1167) 














        0.0086 
(0.2169) 
 






















































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













2  0.1089  0.1086  0.1084  0.1084  0.1085  0.1087 
N  3292  3292  3292  3292  3292  3292 












Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects estimates of the impact of adverse income shocks on Crop 
Stores 














Income Shock  -0.0650 
(0.0411) 
     
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 








































































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 









2  0.0966  0.0858  0.1109  0.1446 
N  4267  1532  1546  1189 








Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 10: Fixed effects estimates of the impact of adverse income shocks on Total 
Borrowing 














Income Shock  1.0729*** 
(0.1610) 
         
Exogenous Shock    0.8778*** 
(0.1628) 
      - 
Exogenous: 
 Natural Shock 






















     
Idiosyncratic: 
Insurable Shock 
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(0.2871) 














        0.2292 
(0.5418) 
 






















































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













2  0.0645  0.0648  0.0635  0.0629  0.0633  0.0629 
N  6132  6132  6132  6132  6132  6132 












Standard  errors  are  given  in  parenthesis.  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  1%  level,  **  indicates 
significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 





Table A1: The likelihood of recovery from shock 
Dependent variable:  Recovered from current shock 





















































































Gender of Household 












Size of Household – 




Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes 




N  1,147  1023 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. A dummy variable representing a shock from 
the death of a family member was dropped from both estimations. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A2: The likelihood of voluntary insurance purchase 
Dependent variable:  Purchased Voluntary Insurance 











































































Gender of Household 












Size of Household – 





Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes 




N  2045  2045 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. A dummy variable representing a shock from the death of a family 
member was dropped from both estimations. 
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Table A3: General Consumption Regression 
Dependent Variable  HH Food Expenditure (2006)  HH Food Expenditure (2008) 
























Gender of Household Head 




















2  0.1624  0.1595 
N  2044  2045 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. 
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Derivation of savings level A: 
First order condition for savings   from equation (3): 
 :               1                  1    ̃                           
 
Rewriting and setting   1        1 and  ̃   0 for simplicity gives: 
                            1                       0 
 
Assuming full insurance coverage for idiosyncratic risk     1 and actuarially fair insurance     1 
gives: 
                                     0 
 
Taking a second order Taylor expansion of           and                        about W gives: 
                 
1
2
         




                1                    0 
 
Separately expanding          1                 gives: 
         1     2        1          2        1                    2        
 
Applying expansion directly into Taylor series approximation gives: 
                 
1
2
         
                            1                 
1
2
                 1  
  2        1          2        1                    2            0 
 
Setting            for idiosyncratic risk insurance premium simplifies to: 
                 
1
2
         
                            1            
1
2
                 1  
  2        1     2        1               2       0 
 
Expanding the terms within the expectations operator gives: 
                 
1
2








           
1
2
                        0 
 
Simplifying terms, with terms of idiosyncratic risk premium   in brackets gives 
 2                      1   
1
2
              1                  1  
                          1    
1
2
                         0 
 
Which equates to: 
 2                      1   
1
2
               1       
                  1  
                          1    
1
2
                         0 
 




      
       
   
      
       
      1   
1
2
       
       
        1       
    
       
       
      1  
   
      
       
   
       
       
      1    
1
2
       
       
    
       
       
      0 
 
Applying the co-efficient of absolute prudence      
     . 




      1 
 
 
        1       
  
2
        1    
 
 
        1    
  
2
       0 
 
Gathering terms of   gives: 
2 
 
        1         














Isolating   gives: 
  
4   2       1    2  
2 
   
2         1       




Approximating   gives: 
   
2         1       
     2      1    2    2       1        
4   2       1    2  
 
 
Which equates to: 
   
2     
  2        1     2      1    2    2       1        
4   2       1    2  
 
 
Which equates to: 
   
2     
    2      1         1    1    2      1      2       1         2 
4   2       1    2  
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